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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Murray Casey Carter appeals from the district court's orders denying his 
Rule 35 motion and motion for the appointment of counsel. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state charged Carter with felony eluding a police officer, 
misdemeanor DUI, and misdemeanor DWP. (R., pp.34-36.) Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Carter pied guilty to the eluding and DUI charges, and the state 
dismissed the remaining charge and agreed to recommend a unified sentence of 
five years, with two years fixed. (R., p.39.) The district court accepted Carter's 
plea and imposed an aggregate unified sentence of five years, with one year 
fixed. (R., pp.48-53.) Carter filed a timely Rule 35 motion for reduction of 
sentence and a motion for the appointment of counsel to represent him on the 
Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.68-71.) The district court denied both motions. (R., 
pp.79-85.) Carter timely appeals. (R., pp.57-59.) 
1 
ISSUES 
Carter states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it refused to appoint counsel 
based on its erroneous conclusion that Mr. Carter's Rule 35 
motion was frivolous? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Carter's Rule 35 motion under the mistaken belief that its 
review power was limited to considering only the fixed 
portion of his sentence? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Carter failed to show the district court abused its discretion in denying 
his motion for the appointment of counsel to pursue a frivolous Rule 35 
motion? 
2. Has Carter failed to show the district court abused its discretion in denying 




Carter Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying 
His Motion For Appointment Of Counsel To Pursue His Frivolous Rule 35 Motion 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied Carter's application for the appointment of 
counsel to represent him on his Rule 35 motion, finding the motion was frivolous. 
(R., pp.79-80.) Carter argues the district court erred because, he contends, it 
"based its decision on a misstatement of the facts, which led to its erroneous 
conclusion that the Rule 35 motion, which was supported by new information, 
was frivolous." (Appellant's brief, p.4.) Carter's argument fails. The record does 
not support Carter's claim that the district court misstated the facts; even if it did, 
the misstatement is immaterial because correct application of the law to the facts 
alleged by Carter in his Rule 35 motion supports the court's ultimate conclusion 
that the motion was frivolous and, therefore, Carter was not entitled to appointed 
counsel to pursue it. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Denial of court appointed counsel under I.C. § 19-852(2)(c) 1 is "within the 
court's discretion" as long as "the court appropriately finds that the claims 
presented are frivolous." Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467, 468-69, 926 P.2d 
1314, 1315-16 (Ct. App. 1996) (addressing a post-conviction proceeding and not 
1 Prior to July 2013, the statutory provision for the appointment of counsel in 
post-conviction proceedings was codified at I.C. § 19-852(b)(3). Effective July 
2013, that provision was re-designated as I.C. § 19-852(2)(c). See 2013 Idaho 
Sess. Laws, ch. 220, § 2, p.515. 
3 
a Rule 35 motion). "A determination of whether a motion for reduction of 
sentence is frivolous for purposes of applying I.C. § 19-852[(2)(c)] is ... one of 
law which [the appellate court] freely review[s]." State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 
526, 873 P.2d 167, 171 (Ct. App. 1994). 
C. Carter Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Ultimate 
Conclusion That Carter's Rule 35 Motion Was Frivolous 
A criminal defendant has the statutory right to counsel at all stages of the 
criminal process, including pursuit of a Rule 35 motion. Murray v. State, 121 
Idaho 918, 923 n.3, 828 P.2d 1323, 1328 n.3 (Ct. App. 1992). However, the 
court may deny appointment of counsel if the Rule 35 motion is frivolous or one 
that a reasonable person with adequate means would not be willing to bring at 
his or her own expense. I.C. § 19-852(2)(c). A determination of whether a 
motion for reduction of sentence is frivolous for purposes of applying I.C. § 19-
852(2)(c) is based on the contents of the motion itself and any accompanying 
documentation that may support the motion. Wade, 125 Idaho at 525, 873 P.2d 
at 170. Any colorable merit to a Rule 35 motion must arise from new or 
additional information that would create a basis for reduction of the sentence. kl 
A district court acts within its discretion in denying a request for court appointed 
counsel under I.C. § 19-852(2)(c) if the court appropriately finds that the claims 
presented are frivolous after reviewing the contents of the motion. Swisher, 129 
Idaho at 468-69, 926 P.2d at 1315-16. 
Carter's Rule 35 motion sought a reduction of the indeterminate portion of 
his sentence from four years to two years. (R., pp.62-64.) As the bases for his 
4 
request, Carter asserted he never intended to elude a police officer, that he only 
did so because he was impaired, and that he was sorry "for not being observant 
of the officer." (R., p.63.) He also claimed to be "attending AA-NA meetings and 
Celbrat[ing] Recovery" while awaiting enrollment in the Therapeutic Community 
program at the prison. (R., p.64.) The district court deemed Carter's Rule 35 
motion frivolous and, therefore, declined to appoint counsel, reasoning: 
In this case, the Court sentenced Carter on January 8, 2014, 
for Count I. Eluding a Police Officer, Felony, I.C. § 49-1401 and 
Count II. Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of 
Alcohol (Second Within Ten Years), Misdemeanor, I.C. §§ 18-
8004, -8005(4). Carter complains about both the indeterminate 
portion of four (4) years on Count I and one (1) year on Count II, 
each count running concurrently; Defendant wants the Court to 
reduce his indeterminate time to two (2) years. 
There was a plea agreement for two (2) years fixed, with 
three (3) years indeterminate on Count I; the Court actually 
reduced the fixed time to one (1) year. 
In his Motion, he argues his sentence should be reduced to 
one (1) year, with two (2) years fixed [sic]. Based on all of this, the 
Court finds that the Motion "is not a proceeding that a reasonable 
person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own 
expense and is therefore a frivolous proceeding." I.C. § 19-
852(b )(3). [2] 
Therefore, the Court denies appointment of counsel to assist 
in pursuing a Rule 35 motion, because it finds the Motion to be 
frivolous. 
(R., pp.79-80 (underlining original).) 
Carter challenges the district court's determination that his Rule 35 motion 
was frivolous, arguing the court based that determination on an erroneous belief 
that the plea agreement "include[d] a provision that he and the State would jointly 
2 See footnote 1, supra. 
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recommend a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed" when, 
"[i]nstead, it provided that the State would cap its recommendation at no more 
than five years, with two years fixed, with Mr. Carter free to argue for probation." 
(Appellant's brief, p.5 (transcript citations omitted).) Carter's argument fails for 
two reasons. First, the district court did not find that the plea agreement called 
for a "joint" sentencing recommendation of two years fixed, with three years 
indeterminate. (See R., p.80.) Second, even if such finding could be inferred 
from court's order, such is not a basis for reversal because a review of the 
record, including the contents of Carter's Rule 35 motion, supports the court's 
ultimate legal conclusion that the motion was frivolous and, therefore, Carter was 
not entitled to the appointment of counsel to pursue it. See Wade, 125 Idaho at 
526, 873 P.2d at 171 (determination of whether Rule 35 motion is frivolous is 
question of law). 
The district court accurately summarized the facts giving rise to Carter's 
convictions in this case, as follows: 
This incident began . . . when Carter broke out the rear 
window of his girlfriend's car and called and threatened to kill her. 
He had previously threatened her. He then drove to another 
house. He was extremely intoxicated and the police went to 
investigate. He spilled beer all over himself. He threatened to 
shoot another woman who was answering a call from his girlfriend. 
He then offered another person $1000 to beat up his girlfriend. 
The officer located him driving and Carter refused to stop and fled. 
He drove on Deer Flat Road from Linder Road at speeds of 
approximately 80 m.p.h. He failed to negotiate a right turn as he 
attempted to head south on Eagle Road causing his car to run over 
a stop sign and slide off the road. His blood alcohol was .135/.116. 
He put a number of people at risk. 
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(R., pp.83-84; see also PSI, pp.3, 19, 23, 25-27, 34-35.) The eluding charge in 
this case was Carter's second felony conviction, and the DUI and DWP were his 
sixth and seventh misdemeanor convictions. (R., p.84; see also PSI, pp.4-5, 50, 
52-53.) Carter also has an extensive juvenile record. (R., p.84; see also PSI, 
p.52.) The district court considered the nature of the crimes and Carter's 
character extensively in sentencing and, although it did not grant Carter's request 
for probation, it did impose a lesser sentence than that recommended by the 
state so that Carter would be immediately eligible for the "intensive treatment" 
provided through the prison's rehabilitative Therapeutic Community program. 
(Tr., p.38, L.17 - p.44, L.24.) 
Carter's Rule 35 motion was not supported by any new information that 
would have warranted a reduction of his sentence. As noted above, Carter 
asserted in the motion that he did not intend to elude the police, that he only did 
so because he was impaired, and that he was sorry for having done so. (R., 
p.63.) All of this information was before the district court at the time it sentenced 
Carter (see PSI, pp.3-4; Tr., p.33, Ls.1-14, p.34, L.25 - p.35, L.11, p.38, Ls.8-
16), and the court specifically took into account the circumstances of the crime 
and Carter's purported remorse in fashioning an appropriate sentence (see Tr., 
p.39, L.4 - p.41, L.20). Thus, the only arguably new information in the motion 
was Carter's self-serving claim, unsupported by any documentation, that he was 
"attending AA-NA meetings and Celebrat[ing] Recovery" while awaiting 
enrollment in the prison's Therapeutic Community program. (R., p.64.) None of 
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this information had any chance of convincing the district court that Carter's 
sentence should be reduced. 
The district court was aware when it sentenced Carter that he had 
previously had the benefit of substance abuse treatment, but such treatment had 
not "accomplished anything" and Carter still remained a "high risk" to reoffend. 
(Tr., p.39, Ls.4-11; PSI, pp.5, 10.) The court also clearly anticipated that Carter 
would participate in rehabilitative programming while incarcerated, as it 
specifically formulated Carter's sentence to facilitate his ability to get the 
"intensive treatment" the court deemed necessary before Carter could be safely 
released to the community. (Tr., p.42, L.18 - p.44, L.24.) Although it is 
commendable that Carter was participating in available rehabilitative programs 
while awaiting the intensive treatment envisioned by the district court, in light of 
the nature of the crimes he committed, his past record, and his past failed 
rehabilitation attempts, such efforts by Carter did not rise to the level of showing 
the motion was not frivolous for purposes of appointing counsel at government 
expense. See Wade, 125 Idaho at 525, 873 P.2d at 170 (any colorable merit to 
a Rule 35 motion must arise from new or additional information that would create 
a basis for reduction of the sentence). 
The record supports the district court's ultimate conclusion that Carter's 
Rule 35 motion was frivolous. Carter has therefore failed to establish the court 




Carter Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying 
His Frivolous Rule 35 Motion 
A. Introduction 
Carter challenges the denial of his Rule 35 motion, arguing the district 
court abused its discretion "because it mistakenly believed that its review of its 
original sentencing decision was limited to the fixed portion of the sentence." 
(Appellant's brief, p.7.) Carter's claim of error is without factual or legal support; 
he has therefore failed to show the district court abused its discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of 
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and the Court reviews the denial 
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Carter must "show that the 
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently 
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." lg_,_ 
C. Carter Has Failed To Show Any Abuse Of Discretion In The Denial Of His 
Rule 35 Motion 
For all of the reasons set forth in Section I.C., supra, and incorporated by 
reference herein, Carter has failed to satisfy his burden of showing that his 
unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed, is excessive in light of any of 
the information he provided to the district court in support of his Rule 35 motion. 
Carter does not contend otherwise. Instead, he argues the district court abused 
its discretion by limiting its review of its original sentencing decision to only the 
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fixed portion of the sentence. (Appellant's brief, p.7.) A review of the record and 
of the applicable law shows Carter is incorrect. 
It is well settled that, in reviewing a sentence, the reviewing court 
presumes that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable 
term of confinement. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 
(2007). The district court recognized as much in its order denying Carter's Rule 
35 motion. (See R., p.83 ("The fixed portion of a sentence imposed under the 
Unified Sentencing Act is treated as the term of confinement for sentence review 
purposes." (Citation omitted).) Although the court expressly found that Carter's 
"one-year fixed sentence for Eluding" was "lenient considering the facts of this 
crime and is well within the statutory sentence guidelines" (Id.), there is no 
indication that the court strictly limited its review to only the fixed portion of 
Carter's sentence. To the contrary, the district court specifically recognized that 
Carter was seeking a reduction of the indeterminate portion of his sentence from 
four to two years, and it denied that request based on a number of factors -
including the nature of the crime and Carter's character, criminal history and 
demonstrated need for treatment - that "suggested the need" for that sentence. 
(R., pp.82-84.) The record thus belies Carter's claim that the district court 
applied an incorrect legal standard. 
Having failed to demonstrate from the record that the district court applied 
an incorrect legal standard, and having failed to even argue, much less 
demonstrate, that his sentence is excessive in light of the information he 
provided to the district court in support of his Rule 35 motion, Carter has failed to 
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establish the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for 
leniency. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
orders denying Carter's Rule 35 motion and his motion for the appointment of 
counsel. 
DATED this 8th day of October 2014. 
I A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney Gen 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 8th day of October 2014, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the 
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
LAF/pm 
RI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney Gen 
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